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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, In the interest of
HALES, FLOYD ROGER (06-24-65)
a person under eighteen years of age
FLOYD ROGER HALE, by his next
of kin and friends and custodians
JOSE LTJJAN AND MAGGIE
LUJAN,
plaintiff and Appellant.

\
I

Case No.
13918

vs.
MARILYN BAKER, CHRIS V.
SAIZ AND MRS. CHRIS V. SAIZ,
'Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the custody of Floyd Roger
Hales, who has been in the custody and control and home
of Jose Lujan and Maggie Lujan since his birth. He
will be ten years old in June, 1975 and that there has
been a very close and affectionate association develop
between the Lnjans, the Lujans' family and Roger.
The Lnjans filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus. The Judgment purports to dispose of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, but is entitled in the case of State
of Utah, in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger.
1
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The file, (record on Appeal), is not in chronological order nor does the file reflect one case, but it reflects two separate cases and papers which really constitute a hybrid of the two cases. The papers in the file
at page 40, 41, 42, and 43 pertain to the Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ. The pleadings
pertaining to the Writ of Habeas Corpus should not be
intermingled with the papers in the case of State of
Utah, in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger.
The papers pertaining to the case of State of Utah,
in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger, are the Affidavit
and Order to Show Cause at page 32 and 33 and a
Motion that the Order to Show Cause not be heard until
the Petition for Extraordinary Writ has been referred
to the Juvenile Court and heard (R. 34) and Answer to
the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause, (R. 35, 36, 37).
This matter was never heard by the Court and no Order
entered on the Order to Show Cause.
The two cases should not have been mixed because
they are two separate and distinct cases.
A Petition for Extraordinary Writ of Habeas
Corpus was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake
County on September 9, 1974, (R. 40, 41, 42). Based on
that Petition, A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by
the Court on September 9, 1974. (R. 43).
Said Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus came on
for hearing on September 25, 1974, and an Order by
Judge Banks of the District Court was made: " I t is
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hereby certified to the Second District Juvenile Court of
the State of Utah based upon Utah Code Annotated
55-10-78."
That the hearing of said case and Petition for
Extraordinary Writ was Floyd Roger Hale, by his next
of kin and friends and customers. Jose Lujan and
Maggie Lujan vs. Marilyn Bakery Chris V. Saiz and Mrs.
V. Saiz, his wife.
That was the last time the heading of the case was
used, notwithstanding the Petition and the "Writ of
Habeas Corpus was heard on October 15, 1974. We
quote from page 4 of the Juvenile Court transcript where
the Court says:
JUDGE WHITMEE: "Alright, the matter is
before the Court, then, on a Writ of Habeas
Corpus which was certified over by the District
Court. Let's see — for hearing in this court.
GOLDEN BOBBINS: Eight.
JUDGE WHITMEE: Alright, you may proceed.''
The Order disposing of the Case was entitled State
of Utah, in the interest of Hales, Floyd Eoger, a person
under 18 years of age, which Order was duly objected
to, but which Order stated " Petition for Extraordinary
Writ is denied.''
That the Court assumed certain facts which were not
in evidence or offered in evidence.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Amended Order disposing of the case was entitled, "State of Utah, in the Interest of Floyd Roger
Hales," but the Amended Order provided that the Petition for Extraordinary Writ is denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks that the Amended Order be reversed
or stricken and that the Plaintiffs be given a hearing on
the Petition for Extraordinary Writ of Habeas Corpus
and that the Juvenile Court be directed to make
recommendations to the District Court in those proceedings and the proceedings be remanded to the District
Court of Salt Lake County.
STATEMENT OF FACT
That the Petition for Extraordinary Writ (Habeas
Corpus) recites that Jose and Maggie Lujan are the
great uncle and great aunt of Floyd Roger Hales, and
that they are the godfather and godmother of Floyd
Roger Hales. That Floyd Roger Hales has been in their
care and custody and under their control since ten days
after his birth and that in the almost ten years that the
Lujans have taken care of him, there has been a close
friendly affectionate association develop.
That Jose and Maggie Lujan have not been deprived
of his custody by any legal proceedings. That the petitioners own their own home, that Roger's mother is
mentally ill and in the Utah State Mental Hospital, and
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that the father of Floyd Roger Hales gave the custody
of the child to the petitioners and they have maintained
and cared for him since his birth. That Floyd Roger Hales
was illegally taken and restrained of his liberty by
Marilyn Baker and Mr. and Mrs. Chris V. Saiz without a
hearing on his rights or the rights of Jose and Maggie
Lujan. That in the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
it is alleged that the legality of petitioners restraint
has not heretofore been adjudicated and no other application for relief has been made and no other speedy or
adequate remedy exists.
That after the "Writ was filed, an Order was made
setting it for hearing on September 25, 1974, at which
time the District Court made an Order transferring the
case to the Second District Juvenile Court by virtue of
Section 55-10-78 part of which is as follows:
" A district court may at any time decline to pass
upon a question of custody and may certify that
question to the juvenile court for a determination
or recommendation.'?
That after the filing of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
an Order to Show Cause was issued by the Juvenile
Court in the case of the State of Utah, in the interest
of Hales, Floyd Roger, and was served upon Jose and
Maggie Lujan. That Jose and Maggie Lujan filed a
Motion that the case not be heard until after the hearing
on the Writ of Habeas Corpus and that an Answer was
filed to the Order to Show Cause, setting out that since
the time that Floyd Roger Hales was two weeks old, he
has been in the care, custody and control of Jose Lujan
5
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and Maggie Lujan and that they are entitled to the
custody and control of Floyd Roger Hales. It further
alleges that the Writ of Habeas Corpus provided for
Roger should be in the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Lujan,
but notwithstanding said Order, Marilyn Baker with
officers arrested Floyd Roger Hales and held him in the
Shelter Home.
That upon a hearing before Richard Birrell, the
hearing Officer, an Order was made that Jose Lujan
and Maggie Lujan continue with the custody of Floyd
Roger Hales until a hearing on the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and that Jose Lujan and Maggie Lujan
have never had a hearing in regard to their rights as to
the care, custody and control of Floyd Roger Hales.
That no further proceedings have been taken in that
case and no order entered pertaining thereto.
The hearing on the Writ of Habeas Corpus was continued until the 24th day of October, 1974, at which time
the Court stated: Page No. 4 of the Juvenile Court
transcript:
"JUDGE WHITMER: Alright, it's a District
Court matter. Alright, I have that.
GOLDEN ROBBINS: Right and it's been referred to your Honor by Judge Banks.
JUDGE WHITMER: Yes, I've got that.
GOLDEN ROBBINS: There should be an Order
in the file.
JUDGE WHITMER: Yes, there is. * * * Alright, the matter is before the Court, then on a
6
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Writ of Habeas Corpus which was certified over
by the District Court. Let's see — for hearing in
this Court.
GOLDEN BOBBINS: Right.''
That Mr. Lujan was called as a witness and a Motion
to Dismiss was made by Michael Stead, Juvenile Court
transcript Page 4, and that no evidence was introduced
in Habeas Corpus case.
None of the file in the case of State of Utah, in the
interest of Hales, Floyd Roger was introduced into
evidence.
That an Order was entered in the case, (R. 47 and
48). Objections to the Order was made (R. 50, 51). An
Amended Order was filed on the 12th day of November,
1974, (R. 52, 53), adjudging that Petition for Extraordinary Writ is denied.
That in the transcript, the Court has made certain
statements and referred to certain instruments which
were not introduced in evidence or even offered in evidence.
After filing the Notice of Appeal, (R. 54) on the
same day there was a Certificate that a Transcript had
been Ordered (R. 57), which transcript was sent to the
Juvenile Court showing it was filed on January 15,1975,
in the Juvenile Court, but someone attached a note
stating: "This volume is not certified as part of the
record in Case No. 13918 — State in the interest of Floyd
Roger Hales." The Juvenile Court prepared a tran7
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script which was filed on March 3, 1975. Both of these
transcripts are numbered separately and are not numbered as part of the record on appeal. Reference to the
transcript is being described as the Juvenile Court
Transcript and the court reporter's transcript. Neither
of the transcripts purport to report any testimony or evidence, but merely the statement of counsel and the Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CHANGING THE HEADING OF THE CASE FROM
THE DISTRICT COURT CASE, PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, TO A
JUVENILE COURT CASE, STATE OF
UTAH IN THE INTEREST OF HALES,
FLOYD ROGER. THE CASE, HABEAS
CORPUS, WAS CERTIFIED FROM THE
DISTRICT COURT TO THE JUVENILE
COURT AND THE CASE HEADING AND
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE ALWAYS
BEEN IN THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE.
That the Writ of Habeas Corpus has always been
used in the State of Utah for the purpose of determining
the custody of children. That the Lujans are entitled to
their day in court. They are entitled to a full and complete hearing on the Writ of Habeas Corpus pertaining
to their rights to the custody of Roger and Roger is
entitled to a hearing on his rights as to who is to have
custody of him.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 7, which states:
8
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"The District court shall have original juridiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by
law; # * * The District courts or any judge
thereof, shall have power to issue writs of habeas
corpus."
Section 55-10-78 provides:
"Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the
district courts of jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a child nor of jurisdiction to determine
the custody of a child upon writ of habeas corpus.''
If Marilyn Baker and Mr. and Mrs. Saiz or the
Juvenile Court wanted to raise the question of jurisdiction, they should have done it by appropriate pleadings
and evidence. No answer or pleading was filed as to the
allegations contained in the petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and no evidence was introduced.
We submit that the Juvenile Court had no right not
to hear the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

POINT

II

THAT WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE THE
COURT DENIED THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND THEREBY DENIED THE
APPELLANTS AND ROGER OF THEIR
DAY IN COURT.
Neither Respondent or the Court or the Appellant
introduced any evidence. There was talk, but no evidence.
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Appellant should have been allowed to introduce
evidence supporting the allegations set out in the Writ
of Habeas Corpus. We submit that the allegations set
out in the Writ of Habeas Corpus state facts upon which
relief could have been granted. The appellants were
deprived of the privilege of showing that the Juvenile
Court never had jurisdiction and to show the fact that
Roger was never a neglected or dependent child. The
Court and counsel for defendant stated that from a moral
obligation that the Lujans were entitled to Roger. The
following cases hold that a child is not dependent or neglected when he is being taken care of by a third party.
In the case of In re State in the Interest of Valdez,
504 P.2d 1372, page 1375 paragraph the Court says:
" T h e fact that the child is being provided for in
the home of someone who is not the child's parent
does not show dependency or neglect. F o r the
parent has the right to determine where and with
whom a child shall live."
In the case of In Re Bradley et al v. Miller et ux, 167
P. 2d 978, on page 985, in the concurring opinion Justice
Wolfe states:
" W h e r e a parent makes arrangements for someone else adequately to care for the child by some
proper and responsible person, such parent may
be, through others, caring for the child."
We have heretofore cited under Point I the Constitution and the statute which would give the Lujans the
right for a hearing under a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

10
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Under Point III we discuss that the Juvenile Court
did not have jurisdiction of the appellant or Roger.
The appellants were denied the right to introduce
evidence and to question the jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court.
POINT

III

JUVENILE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE LUJANS. THEY
WERE NEVER A PARTY TO THE LAWSUIT. THE JUVENILE COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER ROGER, HE NEVER
WAS AND IS NOT NOW A DEPENDENT OR
NEGLECTED CHILD.
There is erroneously in the records of the Juvenile
Court an Affidavit and Order to show Cause in the
Juvenile Court case and the Answer to Affidavit and
Order to Show Cause by the Lujans. The Order to Show
Cause and the Answer to Affidavit and Order to Show
Cause were never heard and the only reason that I can
think that they are in the record is because they were
served after the Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued.
In the Answer of the Lujans, they allege that they
had never had a hearing in regards to their rights to the
care, custody and control of Floyd Roger Hales and there
is no evidence in the case that the Juvenile Court has
obtained jurisdiction over Mr. and Mrs. Lujan. If there
had been any part of the Juvenile Court record put in
evidence, the appellants would have contested the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court in the case of State of Utah,
11
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in the interest of Hales, Floyd Roger and as part of
their authority, would have based their contest on the
case of in re State in the Interest of Graham, et at, 170
P.2d 172, in which case the Court sets out that the petitioners must show that he was a neglected or dependent
child or the Court would never have acquired jurisdiction,
and we quote from Page 175, 1st column as follows:
" A petition must be filed as required by Section
14-7-13. Said petition to invoke the jurisdiction of
the court must allege facts which would make the
children either "Neglected", "Dependent", or
"delinquent" as defined by the Legislature in
Section 14-7-5. The facts found by the court must
be such as to show that the children were "neglected", " d e p e n d e n t " or "delinquent" as defined
by the Legislature; otherwise, the juvenile court
is divested of jurisdiction to make any order in
reference to said children except to dismiss the
case, and to revoke all previous orders made
therein.''
And the court further states on page 175 at the bottom of the first column, quote:
" I t is fundamental that a juvenile court may
make no valid orders in reference to a child unless and until that court obtains jurisdiction of
that child by complying with the statutory requirements therefor. It is just as fundamental
that a parent's right to the custody of his child
cannot be determined so as to bind that parent
unless and until the court obtains jurisdiction
of that parent.''
And in the second column page 175, the court further states:
12
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" T h i s court on appeal will not presume jurisdiction of the juvenile court but will closely examine
the record to see that the legislatively specified
actions have been taken and the necessary facts
are alleged and found to give said court jurisdiction in the particular case.''
The Lujans were never made a party to any proceedings in the Juvenile Court and we contend that the
Juvenile Court never had jurisdiction over Eoger and it
must affirmative appear in the juvenile proceedings
which have never been offered in evidence in the "Writ of
Habeas Corpus case.
In the Graham case, Justice Wolfe calls attention
to the careless way in which the record was kept in the
Juvenile Court case. We have called to the Court's attention the disregard for the continuity of any case and of
the trying of the case within the rules of evidence.
In the case of State of Utah, in the interest of Rae
Lynn Thornton, 422 P.2d 199, 18 Ut. 2d 297, in a custody case, the court on the bottom of the second column
page 200 and the top of the first column page 201 says:
" I n is the opinion of this Court further that the
District Court, being a court of original jurisdiction, pursuant to the Constitution of the State of
Utah, cannot delegate and cannot divest its jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court in a case such as
this."
In the case of Eugene A. Anderson vs. Kathleen D.
Anderson, 416 P.2d 308, 18 U.2d 89, it involves the
question of when the District Court has granted a divorce and awarded custody of children and support
13
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money, and the Juvenile Court in a proceedings in the
interest of the children, makes a different Order, does
its Order supersede the judgment of the District Court.
The Court in answer to this question on page 310 states:
" T o accept plaintiff's contention that the Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction precluding
any further action by the District Court would
have the effect of permitting the Juvenile Court
to become a court of review which could modify
or nullify the judgment and orders of the District Court. This would be neither essential to
nor consistent with the purpose of the new statute, Sees. 15 and 16, Chapter 165 S.L.TT. 1965
(Code identification, Sees. 55-10-77, 78 TJ.C.A.
1953). It is apparent that that purpose was to
confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Juvenile
Court to act in the interest of children in various
kinds of troubled, circumstances set forth in Sec.
77."
Further at the bottom of page 310, 1st column the
Court says:
" T h e District Courts are created by our constitution as courts of general jurisdiction having authority in all cases both civil and criminal. This
includes divorce and all matters relating thereto,
including custody and support money. Whereas,
the Juvenile Court is created by statute and has
jurisdiction only in the cases specified therein.
[3] Upon our consideration of the Juvenile
Court Act hereinabove referred to, it is our opinion that it does not and could not limit or curtail the authority of the District Court. When
that court has taken jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
of the Juvenile Court may be invoked and it may
act in the interest of the children in the cases
specified therein, but its action must be regarded
14
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as supplementary to the action of the District
Court; and it may not make orders in direct conflict with those of the District Court nor does its
authority supersede or divest the District Court
of jurisdiction."
In this case, the Juvenile Court assumes jurisdiction but there was no evidence introduced as to what
the proceedings had been in the Juvenile Court and in
what respect those proceedings affected the Lujans.
The Court should have allowed a hearing and should
have allowed evidence to be taken as to the conditions
Eoger lived under and as to whether or not he had any
preference.
In the case of Hardy vs. Olsen, 180 P. 2d 210, the
child is almost ten years of age and the Supreme Court
held that the Court should inquire of the child and take
into consideration the child's desire regarding further
custody, and in the case of Hardy vs. Olson, page 215,
first column, the Court says:
"but would consider where the child would receive the greater degree of affection and discriminating care which would tend to best fit them
to take their places in the active affairs of life."
And on page 215 top of second column:
"What is for the best interests of the child! See
Walton vs. Coffman, Utah, 169, P.2d 97, and
Baldwin vs. Nelson, Utah, 170, P.2d 179 on rehearing 174 P.2d 437. Presumptions must yield
to evidence that the interests of a child require
it to be in the custody of another. The undisputed evidence is that the father, in this case
15
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neglected to support Judith or to provide for her
welfare except by some infrequent gift of an article of clothing and permitted bonds of affection
to develop between Judith and those who did provide for her well-being until she reached such age
that her choice as to her custody became material
in determining the issue."
In the instant case the boy had been in the home
for nearly 10 years. There have been marked bonds of
affection between him and the Lnjans and in the event
of their death, he would be taken care of by other members of the family, which he feels he is a part of.
In the case of In re State in the interest of Valdez,
504 P.2d 1372, Valdez is accused of murdering his wife
and a petition was filed in the Juvenile Court and it
concluded that the children, as defined by the statute,
were dependent children. The Supreme Court held on
page 1374, as follows :
" ( 1 , 2) The Juvenile Court was created by statute and has jurisdiction only in the cases specified therein. Its jurisdiction concerning custody
and guardianship matters is strictly confined to
those situations where its jurisdiction is invoked
under Section 55-10-77; otherwise all disputes concerning custody and guardianship are within the
juriscdition of the district court, which cannot
delegate or divest itself of jurisdiction to the
Juvenile Court.
And on Page 1375, the Court says:
" I n addition to such inherent jurisdiction, the
district courts have specific statutory jurisdiction in custody matters, e.g. separation and divorce (Section 30-3-10), Habeas corpus proceedings . . . "
16
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POINT IV
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN REFERRED BACK TO THE
DISTRICT COURT FOR HEARING WITH
THE JUVENILE COURTS RECOMMENDATIONS.
In the case of the State of Utah in the interest of
Eae Lyn Thornton, 422 P.2d 199, 18 U. 2d 297, is a custody case, the Court on Page 200 says:
"This case was referred by the Third District
Court of the State of Utah to the Juvenile Court
pursuant to Section 55-10-78, as amended, and
particularly to the provisions stated therein as
follows:
'A district court may at any time decline to
pass upon a question of custody and may certify that question to the juvenile court for
determination or recommendation.' ''
The Court states in the third paragraph, second
column, page 200, and we quote:
"The Juvenile Court assumed jurisdiction over
the subject matter after the same had been referred to it by the District Court. The sole question to be decided is the interpretation of the
section hereinbefore referred to, and particularly
the words: "* * * may certify that question to
the juvenile court for determination or recommendation. ''
And the Court on the bottom of the second column,
page 200 and the top of the first column page 201 says:
" I t is the opinion of this Court that the District
Court, being a court of original jurisdiction, pur17
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suant to the Constitution of the State of Utah,
cannot delegate and cannot divest its jurisdiction
to the Juvenile Court in a case such as t h i s . "
And we quote from page 201, first column, paragraph [2, 3] as follows:
We feel that the proper interpretation that should
be placed upon section 55-10-77, subsection (4),

is this :
That if and when the District Court avails itself
of such a referral to the Juvenile Court, it is
only for the purpose of having the agencies of
the Juvenile Court with the assistance of the
Judge, to make an evaluation, determination or
recommendation. That this having been done by
the Juvenile Court, the Juvenile Court in turn
should make such findings and recommendations
pursuant to the information which it has received
for evaluation and consideration affecting the
custody of the minor children, and refer the matter again to the District Court for its final determination. We think to do otherwise would in
reality distort and make unrealistic the duties
and obligations vested in the District Courts of
the S t a t e . "
In the case of Eugene A. Anderson vs. Kathleen
B. Anderson, 416 P.2d 308, 18 U.2d 89 it involves the
question of when the District Court has granted a divorce and awarded custody of children and support
money, and the Juvenile Court in a proceeding in the
interest of the children, makes a different Order, does
its order supersede the judgment of the District Court,
The Court in answer to this question on Page 310 states:
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"To accept plaintiff's contention that the Juvenile Court has exclusive juridiction precluding
any further action by the District Court would
have the effect of permitting the Juvenile Court
to become a court of review which could modify
or nullify the judgments and orders of the District Court. This would be neither essential to
nor consistent with the purpose of the new statute, Sees. 15 and 16, Chapter 165 S.L.U. 1965
(Code identification, Sees. 55-10-77, 78 IT.C.A.
1953). It is apparent that that purpose was to
confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Juvenile
Court to act in the interest of Children in various
kinds of troubled circumstances set forth in Sec.
77."
In the case of In Re State in the interest of Valdez,
504 P.2d 1372, the Supreme Court held on Page 1374 paragraph No. 3 as follows:
"Since a proceeding is commenced in the Juvenile Court by filing a petition, Section 55-10-83(1)
in the instant action, the case was pending at the
time the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed. Under such circumstances, under the provisions of Section 55-10-78, the district court may
certify the question of custody to the Juvenile
Court for the purpose of evaluation. When this
process is completed and the Juvenile Court has
made findings and a recommendation, the matter
should again be referred to the district for final
determination."
And on Page 1376, the end of the opinion states:
"The instant case is, in fact, a conventional custody dispute between the maternal and paternal
relatives and is within the jurisdiction of the district court. The juvenile court erred in its deter19
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mination that it had exclusive jurisdiction, and
its order granting temporary custody to the Division of Family Services is null and void. This
case is remanded to the Juvenile Court for its
determination concerning the custody of the children, before reference back to the district court
for final determination in the habeas corpus proceedings."

CONCLUSION
We submit that Roger had been with the Lujans for
almost ten years and a close bond of love and affection
has developed, and we submit that he should not have
been taken away from the Lujans without a full and
proper hearing.
The Juvenile Court should never have changed the
heading of the case, and all of the proceedings in the
matter should have been in the case pertaining to the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court should
have allowed evidence to be introduced as to the allegations contained in the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
It is appellants' contention that if appellants would
have been able to proceed in the matter, they could have
introduced evidence and facts which would have shown
that the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction over
the Lujans nor over Roger. In any event, the Juvenile
Court should have heard the matter, made its recommendations and the matter should have been referred
back to Judge Banks of the District Court.
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We submit that the Order should be reversed or
stricken, that a proper hearing be ordered and that the
matter be referred back to the District Court for its final
determination.
Eespectfully submitted:
GOLDEN W. BOBBINS
Attorney for Floyd Roger Hales
by his next of kin and friends
and custodians Jose Lujan
and Maggie Lujan
705 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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